Protected public edge
Cloudflare fronts the public service for TLS termination, DDoS mitigation, and web application protection. API and DNS origins are restricted to the trusted edge and use strict TLS to the origin.
QueryWarden combines private encrypted DNS endpoints, scoped authorization, privacy-enforced event storage, and monitored recovery controls. This page describes the safeguards operating in the public beta and the limits of our claims.
Public services are separated from private control surfaces, and each layer receives only the access it needs to perform its role.
Cloudflare fronts the public service for TLS termination, DDoS mitigation, and web application protection. API and DNS origins are restricted to the trusted edge and use strict TLS to the origin.
Application, database, resolver, and edge roles are separated by internal network boundaries. Workloads use read-only filesystems where practical, reduced Linux capabilities, and no-new-privileges controls.
DNS filtering runs behind a tenant-aware authorization gateway. Resolver administration is not exposed as a customer-facing public interface, and unknown private endpoints are rejected.
Devices can use private DNS-over-HTTPS endpoints. Resolver traffic uses encrypted upstream DNS, DNSSEC validation, and an independent encrypted fallback provider.
Browser state is not authoritative. Sessions, resource ownership, roles, and endpoint access are evaluated by the service on every protected path.
Sign-up and sign-in use short-lived, single-use email links. Session identifiers are random and stored as hashes; production cookies are Secure, HttpOnly, host-only, and SameSite=Lax.
Service administrators must complete TOTP multi-factor authentication. Customer accounts currently use verified passwordless email, so we do not present MFA as available to every account.
Sensitive routes apply bounded request sizes, trusted-origin checks, route-specific rate limits, and human verification for public signup, passwordless sign-in, and unauthenticated contact requests. Authorization and session values are redacted from application logs.
Customer and organization resources are authorized from the active session or scoped token. Organization roles have explicit permissions, and administrative audit records are append-only at the database boundary.
QueryWarden treats retention and anonymization as enforcement rules, not just dashboard preferences. Provider, transfer, and legal-basis details remain in the Privacy Policy.
Each profile can retain full domain history, retain anonymized aggregate activity, or turn domain-level logging off. Anonymized events omit hostname, endpoint attribution, and matched-rule detail; logging off prevents new durable DNS events for that profile.
Every retained DNS event receives an expiry no later than the account plan allows. A profile can shorten, never extend, that boundary. Reducing retention updates existing events, and the Privacy Receipt reports the effective state.
Durable DNS-event rows do not store source IP addresses. Limited source-IP and request metadata is still processed for endpoint authorization, abuse prevention, and service operations as described in the Privacy Policy.
Off-site backups are encrypted, and sensitive credentials are encrypted or stored as one-way hashes where the design requires it. We do not use this page to make a blanket claim that every live database field has application-level encryption at rest.
Continuity controls preserve known-good authorization during bounded failures, while recovery checks test more than whether a backup file exists.
Resolver nodes accept bounded, signed policy snapshots and reject invalid, stale, or rolled-back revisions.
A verified last-known-good policy can continue through a temporary control-plane interruption; authorization fails closed after the snapshot expires.
Automated checks cover public API readiness, DNS authorization and filtering, certificate horizon, service health, storage capacity, and backup freshness.
Encrypted off-site backups run daily, and recurring isolated restore drills verify that database and resolver state can be recovered.
External monitoring observes the public path from a failure domain separate from the core service.
Multi-origin availability remains a launch-gated public capability. Unless a separate written SLA applies, this page does not promise a specific uptime level.
Automated checks focus on security boundaries that can regress: authentication, isolation, privacy, secret handling, authorization, and recoverability.
A canonical capability registry distinguishes available, beta, planned, and launch-gated functionality. Build checks prevent selected gated features from silently appearing as generally available.
Release checks exercise sessions, trusted origins, tenant isolation, role denials, privacy modes, endpoint authorization, signed snapshots, secret handling, and webhook destination defenses.
The delivery process includes linting, production builds, dependency auditing, secret scanning, service readiness checks, DNS canaries, backup evidence, and rollback-aware deployment procedures.
Transparency includes saying where the current security boundary ends.
Send the minimum information needed to reproduce the concern through our protected form. Do not include passwords, complete private DNS endpoints, sign-in links, session cookies, recovery codes, API credentials, or unrelated customer data.
Publishing this policy or security.txt does not grant access to QueryWarden systems. We do not currently offer a monetary vulnerability bounty.
QueryWarden is operated and provided by Digiport OÜ, Viru väljak 2, Tallinn 10111, Estonia. Registration, VAT, and contact details are published in our Company details.